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1 Cities in the global South are increasingly embroiled in contentious struggles over the
right to use, exchange, and manage city spaces (Appadurai, 2001; Bayat, 2000; Chatterjee,
2004; Holston, 2008; Murphy, 2004). Crucial to this body of research is how these urban
struggles are producing new territorial strategies (Jonas & Ward, 2007) and relationships
between urban residents and spaces, fundamentally reconfiguring territories of urban
governance, capital accumulation, and identity (Goldman, 2011; Hsing, 2010; Roy, 2003;
Roy, 2011; Simone, 2004; Yiftachel, 2009). While much of this growing literature on urban
territoriality examines struggles over housing, this article sheds light on how equally
contentious struggles over the development of urban farmland in Senegal’s Dakar Region
also inform theoretical work on the political ecology of urban territorial projects. This
article thus draws upon research in political ecology that examines how various actors
invest in social relations to access, control, and manage land rights (Berry, 1989; Ribot &
Peluso, 2003) that are embedded within larger struggles over territory (Bobrow-Strain,
2007; Carney & Watts, 1990; Lund, 2008; Neumann, 2002; Peluso, 1992).
2 The ethnographic research1 for this article was conducted in Pikine –a rapidly urbanizing
city located roughly fifteen kilometers from Senegal’s capital city Dakar– and examines
recent conflicts over how to develop one of the Dakar Region’s few remaining pockets of
green space.  Within  recent  years,  conflicts  in  the  zone  studied  for  this  article  have
erupted over whether farmland should be used to increase urban food security, produce
horticultural  exports  managed by agribusiness  entrepreneurs,  or  converted into new
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housing estates or roads. I argue that these conflicts over how to develop urban farmland
draw attention to new ways of practicing politics and larger struggles over who can claim
to speak for the state.
3 This  article specifically examines how various public  and private actors advocate for
urban development projects. I argue that these actors are breaking with older forms of
urban governance and increasingly forming what I call 'territorial alliances' that compete
with one another to advance their respective urban development projects. I consequently
argue that these alliances draw upon spatial strategies to advance their alliance's urban
development goals in an effort to consolidate authority over a given zone and profit from
their  respective  urban development  projects.  These  conflicts  and territorial  alliances
emerge from Senegal's  current political  moment,  and signal  a new way of  practicing
urban  politics  in  the  wake  of  structural  adjustment,  Senegal's  1996  decentralization
reforms, rapid rates of urbanization, and rampant land speculation in Dakar.
4 Territory -which I argue here is produced through actors' spatial strategies to govern
urban  political,  economic,  and  environmental  relations-  thus  figures  centrally  in
understanding contemporary struggles over the development of Dakar's urban farmland.
My research thus draws upon Lefebvrian (2007; 2008; 2009) understandings of space and
territory,  arguing  that  Dakar's  frontier  (Roitman,  2005;  Tsing,  2005)  for  urban
development  is  produced  through  the  configuration  of  various  overlapping  and
intertwined territorial strategies (Agnew, 1994; Ballvé, 2012; Moore, 2005; Mbembe, 2000).
5 In describing the complex terrain in which these territorial alliances work, my research
showcases  ethnographies  of  two  distinct  -albeit  interlinked-  episodes  of  contention2
(McAdam  et  al.,  2001)  that  have  played  out  since 1997  over  the  development  of  a
60 hectare tract of urban farmland in Pikine. These ethnographies describe how various
coalitions  draw  from  diverse  -and  competing-  spatial  strategies  to  advance  their
respective territorial projects. Moreover, the ethnographies call attention to significant
diversity and differentiation within state territorial strategies, disrupting notions that
the Senegalese state has been able to present a unified strategy to recentralize natural
resource management in urban settings. Lastly, in reading the outcomes of these conflicts
between territorial alliances this article argues this new way of practicing urban politics
is  actively  transforming  the  cadastre,  property  rights,  and  landscapes  of  built
infrastructure in urban Senegal. 
 
Debates on Urban Politics in Pikine
6 Academic  and  popular  accounts  of  Pikine  frequently  characterize  the  city  as  the
quintessential home to Senegal’s urban slum population that suffers from high crime
rates,  skyrocketing  unemployment,  densely  populated  housing  conditions  with  poor
access to public services, and devastating seasonal flooding. While many residents are
currently attempting to rebrand Dakar’s infamous banlieue (suburb) as a bon-lieu (good
place), the predominant negative framings of Pikine life in terms of environmental chaos
and economic disorder underscore how the urban inequality produced within Pikine –and
between  Pikine  and  Dakar-  during  colonialism  still  bears  its  imprint  in  Senegal’s
collective imagination and material landscapes (Sow, 1982).
7 Originally  home  to  a  handful  of  traditional  Lebu3 villages,  Pikine  began  its  rapid
transformation into one of Senegal’s largest and most densely populated cities in 1952
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when public sanitation fears collided with increases in informal housing settlements,
high rates  of  urban migration,  and downtown Dakar’s  post-WWII  construction boom
(Betts,  1971;  Vernière,  1977).  Residents  displaced  from  Dakar’s  informal  housing
settlements were provided with plots of land to build housing in Pikine. Lebu elite with
autochthonous  property  rights  in  Pikine  also  sold  landholdings  surrounding  their
traditional villages en masse, often to rural migrants and residents displaced from Dakar
who had sold  their  housing plots  in  Pikine’s  formal  neighborhoods  (Vernière,  1977).
Pikine grew faster than any other city in Africa during these formative years (Salem,
1998),  and to this  day Pikine commands high rates  of  demographic  growth (Simone,
2003).
8 Faced with such rapid urbanization and inadequate access to public finances,  debates
concerning how post/colonial governments have sought to govern and provide residents
access  to  public  services  have  figured  centrally in  research  conducted  in  Pikine.
Verniere’s (1973; 1977) research on Pikine, which traces the transformation of the city
from the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, argues that the newly independent Senegalese
state  largely  abandoned  Pikine  populations.  Subsequent  analyses  critique  such
descriptions  of  the  central  state’s  disengagement  in  Pikine,  drawing  attention  to
investments in roads, schools, health clinics, and water fountains made by the central
state (Navarro,  1988).  Moreover,  Salem (1992;  1998)  describes how various Senegalese
state actors fostered urban clientelist relations by providing public services to Pikine
neighborhoods  that  were  able  to  mobilize  significant  levels  of  support  for  Senegal’s
dominant political party.
9 Scholars writing in the wake of Senegal’s 1996 decentralization reforms have increasingly
focused on how political decentralization is creating new social relations between local
governments and residents.  This research acknowledges the continued significance of
traditional authorities –whose political work is largely underestimated by Verniere and
Salem-  and  emphasizes  how  political  decentralization  reforms  have  produced  new
political  networks  between  traditional  authorities,  local  government  officials,  and
associational life that extend beyond the neighborhood clientelist relations outlined by
Salem (Abdoul,  2002, 2005; Simone, 2003, 2004).  Nonetheless,  the role of central state
government actors –who figure prominently in Verniere’s and Salem’s accounts of Pikine
politics- largely disappear from these recent analyses of urban governance in Pikine.
10 By downplaying the roles of central state actors, this research underplays the new and
complex ways that politics practiced by central state bureaucrats and politicians are also
woven into urban political life. In doing so, it fails to fully interrogate how local politics in
Senegal  have  been  transformed by  broader  political  and  economic  forces  (Mohan &
Stokke, 2000), of which structural adjustment programs, Senegal's 1996 decentralization
reforms,  and  President  Wade's  regime  (2000-2012)  figure  centrally.  This  article  thus
situates  this  study  of  current  urban  politics  within  a growing  body  of literature
characterizing  Senegal's  transition  towards  neoliberalism  and  Wade's  presidency  in
terms  of  rampant  urbanization  and  land  speculation,  increased  institutional
disorganization, worsening corruption, and escalating social inequality (Diop, 2004; Diop,
2013a,  2013b;  Gaye,  2010).  My  analysis  of  conflicts  over  the  development  of  urban
farmland in the following sections examines how a large variety of actors are forming
territorial  alliances  -including elected local/central  government  officials,  government
bureaucrats, Senegal's various police forces, associations, and I/NGOs- to lobby for and
advance their territorial strategies.
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Historical Context for Current Territorial Conflicts over
Pikine Farmland
11 Located  on  the  fringes  of  several  of  Pikine’s  oldest  neighborhoods  –spanning  the
administrative  districts  of  Pikine  North  and Pikine West–  land conflicts  in  the  zone
examined for this study were historically comprised of border disputes and struggles over
land  rights  between  autochthonous  Lebu  landowners  and  farmers  who  had  rented,
bought, or been gifted land held by previous Lebu owners. While smallholder farmers in
this  zone were summarily denied formal  property rights,  land transactions in Pikine
became increasingly common after the implementation of Senegal’s 1964 land law (Salem
1998;  Vernière  1977).  Rampant  land  transactions  continued  during  Senegal’s  various
droughts during the 1970s and 1980s, when inadequate access to water, migration-related
land pressures, and the development of Pikine’s industrial and fishing sectors led many
landowners  to  sell  their  landholdings.  Moreover,  many farmers  who were  unable  or
unwilling to farm year-round sold their fields because they were increasingly unable to
defend land claims during land disputes prompted by this burgeoning land market.
12 For instance, one autochthonous landowner described a conflict in Pikine North in which
an autochthonous landowner’s (Landowner 1) field was claimed and later sold by another
land user (Landowner 2). After Landowner 2 had farmed Landowner 1's field for ten years,
a dispute broke out when Landowner 2 planted trees and staked ownership rights to the
land. The matter was then referred to the police and local courts. Landowner 2 was able
to create a territorial alliance by drawing upon political connections to win his case and
dispossess  Landowner  1  of  his  farmland,  as  Landowner  1  had  been  unable  to  build
territorial alliances.
13 During this period, many farmers without autochthonous land rights were afraid that
Pikine’s land market and concomitant land conflicts would transform their zone into
something  similar  to  the  informal  housing  settlements  that  dominate  scholarly  and
popular writing on Pikine. One of the largest and most influential farmer associations in
Pikine, PROVANIA, was initially founded in 1991 by various farmers who had migrated
from Dakar or surrounding regions (and thus did not hold autochthonous land rights)
who organized to protect land they had purchased from expropriation –and land sales–
by autochthonous landowners. After these farmers created PROVANIA, conflicts with the
autochthonous landowners decreased. The association developed a territorial strategy to
preserve land in the zone for farmland by purchasing land from willing Lebu sellers in
adjacent fields until autochthonous landownership in the zone was concentrated in a few
pockets of land and various isolated fields surrounded predominantly by landowners and
farmers without autochthonous rights.
14 The first major dispute that erupted in the zone after the creation of PROVANIA was thus
not between Lebus and farmers without autochthonous rights, but instead began in 1997
when agribusiness  entrepreneurs  used connections with elite  government officials  in
President Abdou Diouf’s regime –including garnering the support of the Prime Minister–
to obtain a long-term lease for land used by Pikine smallholder farmers for an export-
oriented  floriculture  project.  After  numerous  court  orders  were  sent  to  expropriate
Pikine farmers' land, the farmers were able to stall their eviction in 2000 by organizing
large protests to confront bulldozers and police; voicing their dispute over popular radio
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stations; engaging a leading Lebu lawyer, politician, and scholar of land rights to defend
their  claim  in  court;  and  mobilizing  the  support  of  various  Pikine  mayors,  local
traditional authorities, and I/NGOs.
15 This initial struggle served as a watershed moment in conflicts over urban farmland in
Pikine. First, it marked a shift towards conflict engaged between competing territorial
alliances,  as  opposed to  conflicts  over  smaller  tracts  of  farmland between individual
landowners and users able to form territorial alliances, as described above. This conflict
also  opened  the  floodgate  for  subsequent  land  conflicts  over  large  tracts  of  Pikine
farmland. Since 2000, farmer associations in this zone have been continuously involved in
land  conflicts  as  various  actors  seek  to  carve  up  their  land  for  a  slew  of  urban
development  projects.  The  two  conflicts  outlined  in  the  following  sections  describe
farmers’ struggles to curtail efforts by land developers and a host of government actors
that  seek  to  build  middle-class  and  elite  housing  estates  on  Pikine  farmland.  These
disputes take place in Pikine West and Pikine North on land that was initially targeted for
the export-oriented floriculture project outlined above. The conflicts described not only
unfold at different moments, but farmers confront distinct –albeit interlinked- political,
economic, and ecological geographies. My analysis of these two contentious episodes thus
relies  upon an  examination  of  how dramatically  divergent  political  geographies  and
dispute outcomes are produced by spatially differentiated territorial strategies –in terms
of how territorial alliances are brokered, co-opted, de/mobilized, coerced, radicalized, or
internationalized (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007).
 
Pikine West
16 Open conflict over the transformation of eight hectares of farmland into a housing estate
in Pikine West began shortly after the landmark dispute described above. In 2002, Pikine
West elected a new district mayor4 who began to broker a territorial alliance to transform
the disputed land into a middle-class and elite housing estate. Local bureaucrats in Pikine
informed me that the district mayor signed a protocole d’accorde with the agribusiness
entrepreneurs to gain access to their claims to land. The mayor also began to organize a
series of secretive meetings with bureaucrats in the Ministry of Land and Taxes and the
Ministry of  Urbanism, private land developers,  and select  landowners to develop the
disputed terrain.
17 The district mayor’s attempts to spearhead the construction of a middle-class and elite
housing project was a central component of his territorial governing strategies. Research
on Senegal’s current wave of ‘speculative urbanism’ (Goldman 2011) has pivoted around
increased investments in massive infrastructural projects since President Wade’s election
in 2000 (Galvan 2001; Melly 2013). Often working in tandem with central government
actors and private real estate developers, many local urban government officials have
also sought to strengthen their urban governance regimes by facilitating the construction
of  new housing  projects.  Local  governments  rely  upon a  quota  system to  distribute
serviced housing plots in new housing estates to bolster political and/or administrative
support. In Pikine, roughly 25 percent of serviced plots can potentially be used to provide
land  –and  financing-  to  party  militants and  various  government  administrators  in
exchange for their political and/or administrative support.5
Housing  projects  that  follow  Pikine’s  official  quota  system  thus  rely  upon  strategic
territorial  alliances  between  landowners  willing  to  sell  their  land,  private  housing
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developers and cartographers, local government officials (including elected district/city
mayors, their council members, and local land management bureaucrats),  and central
government officials (mostly bureaucrats in the Ministry of Urbanism and the Ministry of
Land and Taxes). However, the housing project undertaken in Pikine West did not follow
these guidelines. Instead, the district mayor attempted to take more than his allowed
quota of housing plots by providing inadequate housing plot compensation to landowners
whose plots had been expropriated. He also attempted to avoid paying housing plot quota
requirements by ‘hiding’ the project from the city Mayor’s office and various central
government officials. The district mayor thus promised to provide housing plots directly
to government actors –in the Ministry of Urbanism, the Ministry of Land and Taxes, and
various  police  forces-  who  helped  provide  coercive  force  to  dispossess  landowners
resistant  to  the  housing  project  and  secure  necessary  paperwork  without  following
Pikine’s quota system.
18 Conflicts over the new housing project reached their climax between 2006-7 when the
district mayor and his chosen private housing developer sent a team of bulldozers and
local police to expropriate farmers' land. While several farmers I spoke with noted how
they met –publicly and privately– with the district Mayor to discuss the project before
the bulldozers arrived, many farmers were not privy to these negotiations and instead
described how the bulldozers arrived in their fields without warning. In the end, the
district  mayor’s  coalition was  able  to  divide  landowners  and renters  into  two clans:
landowners who felt that they had no choice but to support the new housing estate, and a
combination of landowners and renters who harshly critiqued and mobilized against the
project. Landowners who supported the project did so for three main reasons: 1/many
landowners –especially those renting out land– were convinced that selling their land
was more profitable than farming, 2/ some landowners land claims were shared by family
members who didn’t farm and wanted to profit from high land prices, and 3/none of the
landowners held formal land titles and they were afraid that the mayor’s alliances or
subsequent conflicts would expropriate their land without providing farmers with any
compensation.  Various  landowners  –including  the  leaders  of  Pikine  West’s  farmers’
association- were thus co-opted by the district mayor’s territorial alliance and negotiated
to exchange their land rights for serviced housing plots.
19 The district mayor and his territorial alliance was unable to co-opt renters –who were not
compensated at all- and landowners who argued that the land deal didn’t follow Pikine’s
quota system or adequately compensate them for their land rights. Farmers resistant to
the new housing project mobilized to create a new farmer association (as the older group
had disbanded after the exit of leaders who supported the housing project), stood in front
of bulldozers, fought with local and national police, filed complaints in court, and voiced
their concerns over the radio. Farmers also knocked on doors of powerful politicians who
had the ear of President Abdoulaye Wade, who eventually sent a special commission to
investigate farmers’ complaints and involved Pikine’s city-wide mayor in the conflict.
20 These actions in turn caused the district mayor to renegotiate his territorial alliances.
When  other  district  mayors  and  powerful  politicians  heard  about  the  project  they
negotiated to receive housing plots in exchange for their consent. For example, the city
Mayor negotiated for the provision of housing plots for disgruntled landowners. He also
offered to compensate some dispossessed landowners and renters for the loss  of  the
investments  they  had made  on their  land by  providing  them with  serviced  plots  in
another  housing  subdivision  in  Pikine’s  peri-urban  fringes.  In  exchange  for  these
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concessions,  the remaining landowners and renters were co-opted within the district
mayor’s territorial alliance and agreed to relinquish their land rights.
21 This final reconfiguration of territorial alliances proved problematic for Pikine West’s
district mayor. While the housing estate was eventually built,  the number of housing
plots he had promised exceeded the total number of plots created. One of the leaders in
Pikine West’s defunct farmers’ association recalled a grim conversation when the district
mayor informed him that he would be receiving three –instead of eight– housing plots in
exchange  for  his  work  initially  securing  the  consent  of  many Pikine  farmers.  When
describing this conversation, the ex-leader noted how the mayor remarked how he had
really helped advance the housing project, but that the mayor was overwhelmed with
requests for housing plots by the prefect, governor, district mayors, and ministers who
heard  about  the  project  in  this  sector.  Various  individuals  who  bought  land  at  the
project’s conception also took the district mayor to court when they didn’t receive the
plots they were promised. Finally, the youth football team was also upset when land for
the field they had been promised was instead divvied into housing plots.  These and
various  other  actors  upset  about  how  land  for  the  housing  project  was  distributed
complained vociferously during the 2008 local elections. Many residents argue that the
district mayor’s –and to some extent also the city mayor’s- failed re-election bids were
thus due to the public’s discontent over their involvement in the Pikine West housing
project. This political shift indicates that the territorial alliances that were so crucial in
advancing  the  district  mayor’s  territorial  strategies  –and  thus  transforming  most  of
Pikine West’s farmland into middle-class and elite housing- were ultimately unable to
withstand the repercussions of how the shady land deal in Pikine West unfolded.
 
Pikine North
22 Farmer  associations  had  already  been  active  in  Pikine  North  prior  to  the  conflict
instigated by  horticultural  entrepreneurs.  As  mentioned earlier,  the  most  prominent
association, PROVANIA, was largely populated by farmers without autochthonous land
rights  who  developed  a  territorial  strategy  of  buying  farmland  from  willing
autochthonous sellers in order to ensure that their zone would be reserved for urban
farming. Moreover, farmers in PROVANIA also brokered strategic alliances with local and
government officials and I/NGOs to invest in urban agriculture and demonstrate how
urban agriculture in Pikine contributed to the development of Senegal’s Dakar Region by
providing  a  significant  number  of  jobs,  contributing  to  regional  food  security,  and
safeguarding  the  local  ecosystem.  PROVANIA  thus  worked  closely  with  central
government  officials  in  the  Ministry  of  Urbanism  drafting  plans  to  safeguard  their
farmland and the local ecosystem, which resulted in a presidential decree that ostensibly
protected  farmland  in  the  zone  from  development.  The  association  also  brokered
alliances with government agencies providing technical assistance to Senegalese farmers,
and  at  one  point  was  working  with  at  least  five  different  I/NGOs  on  agricultural
development projects.
23 In order to secure their access to treated wastewater,  farmers also began to develop
strategic alliances in 2004 with I/NGOs, local government authorities in various Pikine
mayor offices,  the government agency charged with treatment of wastewater, and an
international team of academics and Senegalese government employees (in the Ministry
of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health). While farmers in nearby zones are able to rely
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upon hand-dug wells to access water, many of the fields used by PROVANIA farmers stand
on higher elevations which means that they are unable to obtain water to irrigate their
fields unless they dig costly wells. The initial wastewater project thus brokered a dynamic
alliance  between  a  variety  of  public  and  private  actors  to  design  best  practices  for
wastewater  use  in  agriculture  and construct  several  wastewater  treatment  basins  on
PROVANIA farmers’ fields. This project was then expanded –with the FAO coordinating
funding from the Spanish government– to helped farmers 1/formally negotiate access to
wastewater treated by Senegal’s public-private water sanitation authority and 2/provide
farmers with water pumps and a vast network of PVC pipes and infrastructure used to
distribute treated wastewater to farmers’ fields.
24 While PROVANIA farmers were building international territorial alliances with I/NGOs,
various government bureaucrats, and other farmer associations to promote agricultural
development projects and secure their claims to land, the agribusiness entrepreneurs
who attempted to expropriate farmers' land in 2000 were reconfiguring their territorial
alliances and strategies to develop farmland held under their long-term lease. First, the
entrepreneurs decided that they would abandon their agricultural endeavors and instead
use  the  land  to  develop  new  housing  estates.  Given  that  their  original  attempts  to
dispossess  farmers based on formal  land rights  obtained through territorial  alliances
failed, they instead chose to draw upon similar territorial strategies originally practiced
by PROVANIA farmers. They began offering to buy farmland from willing sellers; this
would allow them to secure pockets of land while co-opting association members and
fracturing the territorial authority held by PROVANIA. In 2010 they were able to buy a
small  tract  of  farmland  from  a  Lebu  landowner  and  installed  a  small  shop  on  the
property.
25 These  actions  produced  conflict  between  the  entrepreneurs/housing  developers  and
farmers in the zone, largely because the individual who sold his land initially refused to
admit  that  he  had  accepted  money  from  the  developers.  PROVANIA  farmers
acknowledged that the landowner had the right to sell his field to whomever he wanted,
and  once  it  was  confirmed  that  the  Lebu  landowner  had  indeed  sold  his  field  they
dropped the conflict. Yet this small land purchase served as the entry-point to a larger
conflict when the housing developers hired a bulldozer to prepare this newly acquired
field for a new housing project. Once the field had been leveled, the bulldozer passed by
several nearby fields that were serviced by the wastewater project and began bulldozing a
field that was not being farmed because it lacked access to irrigated water.
26 PROVANIA  farmers’  reaction  was  to  mobilize  their  alliances  with  other  farmer
organizations and local traditional authorities to form a delegation to speak with various
government officials. The delegation visited the prefect (who was not in her office), sub-
prefect, and city Mayor’s office but was unable to uncover which government authority
had authorized the developer’s activities. It was only after meeting with the commissaire 
of  the  local  police  who  had  sent  roughly  20  police  to  oversee  the  project  that  the
delegation  learned  that  the  prefect  had  sent  a  letter  asking  the  police  to  intervene
because local farmers were keeping developers from ‘doing their job’ and developing the
zone.  The conflict  escalated when farmers began to fight with local policemen. After
several hours of what farmers described as a ‘violent battle,’ the commissaire withdrew his
troops arguing that he didn’t want to be responsible for any casualties. Over the following
days farmers and policemen waited in the fields but the bulldozers and developers never
returned. Farmers contend that this was in part because the proprietor of the bulldozer
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refused to hire out his machine when he heard about farmers’ purchases of gas and plans
to burn the bulldozer if it returned.
27 This conflict has been at a standstill since farmers’ altercations with local police. Farmers
continue  to  cultivate  land  in  the  zone,  and  it  appears  that  the  farmers’  territorial
alliances with I/NGOs and a variety of government officials are –at least temporarily–
proving stronger than the territorial coalitions produced by housing developers. While I/
NGO and government officials who have partnered with farmers have largely remained
silent during land conflicts,  farmers  have relied upon material  investments  by these
partners, physical violence and threats of property destruction, and relationships with
nearby farmers and traditional authorities to defend their land claims. Contrary to the
housing development in Pikine West, housing developers have not been able to co-opt




28 This article has focused on conflicts over whether Pikine’s remaining tracts of farmland
should be used for the development of middle-class and elite housing estates or for the
development  of  agricultural  projects  that  ensure  food  security  and  employment
opportunities for the greater Dakar region. The contentious episodes examined in Pikine
West  and  Pikine  North  vary  significantly  from  historical  land  conflicts  over  urban
farmland in Pikine, as disputes between landowners and land users over individual fields
are progressively being replaced by larger conflicts involving a wide range of public and
private actors.  The main thrust of this article thus examines how recent contentious
struggles over the development of new housing estates are increasingly relying upon new
forms  of  territorial  alliances  to  shape  the  development  trajectories  of  Pikine's  few
remaining tracts of farmland.
29 In describing the increased reliance of territorial alliances in Pikine, this article sheds
new light on the literature examining 'the right to the city' and concomitant struggles to
use, exchange, and manage urban spaces. Much of the current literature on the 'right to
the city' examines housing politics. By focusing on struggles that pivot around farming
and housing,  this  article  brings  this  urban politics  literature  into  conversation  with
research in political ecology examining questions of access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) -rather
than rights-  to  urban land.  I  have thus  argued how landowners  and users  in  Pikine
strategically invest in social relations (Berry, 1989) through the formation of territorial
alliances in order to secure access to urban land.
30 These  territorial  alliances  are  characterized  by  coalitions  formed  between  farmer
associations,  traditional  authorities,  housing  developers,  local/central  government
officials, and I/NGOs. Yet these competitive territorial alliances are notable not only for
their  flexibility,  but  also  for  their  fragility.  Territorial  alliances  are  constantly  being
negotiated and reconfigured throughout the duration of each conflict highlighted in this
article. Farmer associations’ struggles with local police in Pikine North stalled the conflict
by weakening the territorial  alliance formed between the police,  prefect and housing
developer.  President  Wade  and  the  city  mayor  in  Pikine  were  later  included  in  the
territorial alliance coordinated by the Pikine West mayor in order to effectively disband
territorial alliances produced by the farmer groups that were against the new housing
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project.  Territorial  alliances  thus  operate  in  a  state  of  flux  and  are  de/constructed
through a wide variety of territorial strategies.
31 In studying these strategies, this article draws attention to significant spatial variations
in  how  various  actors’  practice  contentious  politics  in  two  different  administrative
districts within one of Senegal’s largest cities. These districts are home to distinct –albeit
interlinked– political, economic, and ecological geographies that have greatly influenced
how contention between territorial alliances played out during land struggles. The initial
territorial  alliance  produced to  negotiate  Pikine  West’s  new housing estate  was  first
brokered by the district mayor, who was able to co-opt key members of farmer groups
and  continually  include  various  local  and  central  government  officials  within  his
coalition. The territorial alliance produced by housing developers in Pikine North was
unable to replicate mechanisms and processes undertaken by the district Mayor in Pikine
West. While developers were able to form alliances with key central government officials
and co-opt one farmer (who sold them his land), they were unable to build additional
alliances to strengthen their land claims with local and high-level central government
officials. Moreover, they were unable to co-opt the farmers’ association or convince its
leaders to defect. Instead, the organization relied upon international concerns over food
security  and the zone’s  water-poor geography to build strong alliances  with I/NGOs,
local/central government officials, other farmer associations and traditional authorities
to defend their land claims. Farmers in Pikine North were also able to escalate tensions
and puncture holes within territorial  alliances coordinated by housing developers by
threatening property destruction and collective violence against local police. Thus, while
certain territorial strategies were present in struggles in both Pikine North and Pikine
West (e.g., brokerage and mobilization of territorial alliances that frequently rely upon
coercive  force),  there  are  also  important  differences  in  the  ways  in  which  various
coalitions advocated for their territorial project (e.g., territorial alliances’ ability to rely
upon  international  relations,  escalate  tactics,  and/or  co-opt  and  demobilize  key
coalitions) (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007).
32 Studying the similarities  and variations in how these various territorial  alliances are
constructed  in  Pikine  North  and  Pikine  West  also  sheds  light  on  the  increasingly
significant  roles  played  by  local  government  officials  (Abdoul,  2005;  Simone,  2004).
Senegal’s  1996  decentralization  reforms  –combined  with  the  rise  of  speculative  land
markets and high rates of demographic growth– have thus helped shape new interactions
between  local  governments,  farmer  associations,  and  I/NGOs.  Yet  this  by  no  means
indicates that the central government is no longer a central actor in negotiations over
how to  develop  Pikine’s  remaining  farmland.  Instead,  this  article  examines  the  new
relations  formed  between  associational  life,  central  government  officials,  and
decentralized local governmental officials.
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NOTES
1. Fieldwork  for  this  article  was  conducted  between  2011-2013,  and  is  part  of  a  larger
comparative study of contentious land politics in Senegal’s Dakar Region.
2. Various scholars have noted that the field of contentious politics loosely integrates spatial
analyses (Martin & Miller, 2003; Sewell, 2001; Tilly, 2003). While various scholars have begun to
examine dynamics  of  contention in  relation to  Lefebvrian understandings  of  how space  and
social life are mutually constituted (Cresswell, 1996; Hart, 2002; Mitchell, 2003; Wolford, 2003),
spatial analysis remains an interesting lacuna within research on contentious politics.
3. The Lebu were the first inhabitants of the Dakar Region (Sylla, 1992). Throughout this article I
refer to the Lebu as the autochthonous population, drawing from Geshiere's (2009) work tracing
understandings of autochthony to notions of being “from the soil” and an authentic belonging to
a specific territory (p. 2).
4. The organization of  local  government in large urban areas in Senegal  (e.g.,  Dakar,  Pikine,
Rufisque)  is  very  elaborate,  with  the  city  mayor  charged  with  executive  and  administrative
duties  for  municipality's  entire  territory,  which  is  broken  down  into  districts  (or
arrondissements) that are headed by district mayors.
5. Pikine’s quota system distributes serviced housing plots as follows: those selling land rights
retain 65% of plots, central government administration receive 10%, local government obtains
10%, 10% is used to pay for work preparing land for the housing project, and the remaining 5%
finances work conducted by private housing developers and cartographers.
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ABSTRACTS
Contentious territorial struggles over how to manage and develop city spaces figure centrally in
research on urban governance in  the global  South.  Drawing from ethnographic  fieldwork in
Pikine, a rapidly urbanizing city in Senegal’s Dakar Region, this article examines how Dakar's
political geography is being transformed by the configuration of multiple, overlapping territorial
strategies for the development of urban farmland in one of the region’s few remaining pockets of
green spaces. Through analysis of two spatially distinct –albeit interlinked– episodes of conflict
over the development of middle-class and elite housing projects on Pikine farmland, I argue that
various public and private actors –including farmers, traditional authorities, housing developers,
and local/central government officials– are breaking with older forms of urban governance and
forming what I call “territorial alliances” to stake land claims and advance urban development
projects. These territorial alliances are producing new political relations between local/central
government  actors  and  associational  life  while  also  dramatically  transforming  the  cadastre,
property rights, and landscapes of public infrastructure in urban Senegal.
Les litiges territoriaux qui concernent la gestion et l’aménagement des espaces urbains occupent
un rôle central dans la recherche sur la gouvernance urbaine dans les pays du Sud. A partir du
travail de terrain réalisé par l’auteur à Pikine, une ville qui s’est rapidement urbanisée dans la
région  de  Dakar  (Sénégal),  cet  article  montre  comment  la  géographie  politique  de  Dakar  se
transforme  par  les  reconfigurations  spatiales  engendrées  par  des  stratégies  territoriales
multiples et superposées visant au développement d'une agriculture urbaine là où des poches
d'espaces verts sont préservées. L’analyse de 2 cas de conflits –différents mais interconnectés- à
propos de l’aménagement de terres  agricoles  urbaines  en vue de lotissements  pour la  classe
moyenne et les élites permet à l’auteur d’affirmer que des acteurs publics et privés - notamment
des producteurs, des autorités traditionnelles, des promoteurs immobiliers, et des officiels dans
les  gouvernements  locaux/centraux-  abandonnent  les  anciennes  formes  de  gouvernance  au
profit  « d’alliances territoriales » afin de promouvoir leurs propres projets de développement
urbain.  Ces  alliances  territoriales  conduisent  à  de nouvelles  relations entre les  membres  des
gouvernements locaux/centraux et la société civile et ont une incidence sur le cadastre, les droits
de propriété et les infrastructures publique du Sénégal urbain.
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